Nhờ sửa bài giúp

In theory, when trade agreements are negotiated, a set of public policies is determinated in order to allow the economy to benefit as much as possible from the agreements.

Nonetheless, Lobbying and clientelism are strengths which astringed the optimality of the reform in respond to the opening.

Diverging with the damaged interests, a social policy or, in a more comprehensive way, a public policy can be revealed as unlikely.

The creation of feasibility index fed with the figures got from Computable General Equilibrium Models (CGEM) is a tool which allows to determinate a vector of public policies which accompany the opening.

The general equilibrium of the economy in these conditions gives the ex-ante results of the opening on macroeconomic variables and notably enables to observe the evolution of poverty and inequality.

This latter point has all its interest when the effects of the trade opening on the economy of a Least Developed Country (LDC) such Senegal come to be considered.

By making the difference between the obtained economic situation taking the effects of lobbying and clientelism into account and the one which should have taken place in the absence of these effects, a social cost of lobbying and clientelism can be discerned.